EMI and the CT Scanner Essay Essays

EMI and the CT Scanner Essay Essays EMI and the CT Scanner Essay Paper EMI and the CT Scanner Essay Paper In early 1972 there was considerable dissension among top direction at EMI Ltd. the UKbased music. electronics. and leisure company. The topic of the contention was the CT scanner. a new medical diagnostic imagination device that had been developed by the group’s Central Research Laboratory ( CRL ) . At issue was the determination to come in this new concern. thereby establishing a variegation move that many felt was necessary if the company was to go on to thrive. Complicating the job was the fact that this radical new merchandise would non merely take EMI into the fast-changing and extremely competitory medical equipment concern. but would besides necessitate the company to set up operations in North America. a market in which it had no anterior experience. In March 1972 EMI’s board was sing an investing proposal for ?6 million to construct CT scanner fabricating installations in the United Kingdom. Development of the CT Scannercompany background and historyEMI Ltd traces its beginnings back to 1898. when the Gramophone Company was founded to import records and gramophones from the United States. It shortly established its ain fabrication and recording capablenesss. and after a 1931 amalgamation with its major challenger. the Columbia Gramophone Company. emerged as the Electric and Musical Industries. Ltd. EMI Ltd rapidly earned a repute as an aggressive technological pioneer. developing the automatic record modifier. two-channel records. magnetic recording tape. and the innovator commercial telecasting system adopted by the BBC in 1937. Get downing in 1939. EMI’s R A ; D capablenesss were redirected by the war attempt toward the development of fuses. airborne radio detection and ranging. and other sophisticated electronic devices. The company emerged from the war with an electronics concern. mostly geared to defenserelated merchandises. every bit good as its traditional amusement concerns. The passage to peacetime was peculiarly hard for the electronics division. and its hapless public presentation led to efforts to prosecute new industrial and consumer applications. EMI did some exciting pioneering work. and for a piece held hopes of being Britain’s taking computing machine company. Market leading in major electronics applications remained elusive. nevertheless. while the music concern boomed. The 1955 acquisition of Capitol Records in the United States. and the subsequent success of the Beatles and other entering groups under contract to EMI. put the company in a really strong fiscal place as it ent ered the seventiess. In 1970 the company had earned ?21 million before revenue enhancement on gross revenues of ?215 million. and although extraordinary losingss halved those net incomes in 1971. the company was optimistic for a return to old net income degrees in 1972 ( see exhibits 10. 1 to 10. 3 for EMI’s fiscal public presentation ) . Around that clip. a alteration in top direction signaled a alteration in corporate scheme. John Read. an accountant by developing and antecedently gross revenues manager for Ford of Great Britain. was appointed main executive officer after merely four old ages in the company. Read recognized the risky. even fickle. nature of the music concern. which accounted for two-thirds of EMI’s gross revenues and net incomes. In an attempt to alter the company’s strategic balance. he began to deviate some of its significant hard currency flow into legion acquisitions and internal developments. To promote internal invention. Read established a research fund that was to be used to finance advanced developments outside the company’s immediate involvements. Among the first undertakings financed was one proposed by Godfrey Hounsfield. a research scientist in EMI’s Central Research Laboratories ( CRL ) . Hounsfield’s proposal opened up an chance for the company to diversify in the aggressive medical electronics field. ct scanning: the construct In simple footings. Hounsfield’s research proposal was to analyze the possibility of making a threedimensional image of an object by taking multiple X-ray measurings of the object from different angles. so utilizing a computing machine to retrace a image from the informations contained in 100s of overlapping and crossing X-ray pieces. The construct became known as computerized imaging ( CT ) . Although computerized imaging represented a conceptual discovery. the engineerings it harnessed were rather good known and understood. Basically. it linked X-ray. informations processing. and cathode beam tubing show engineerings in a complex and precise mode. The existent development challenge consisted of incorporating the mechanical. electronic. and radiographic constituents into an accurate. dependable. and sensitive system. Figure 10. 1 provides a conventional representation of the EMI scanner. exemplifying the linkage of the three engineerings. every bit good as the patient managing table and X-ray gauntry. Advancement was rapid. and clinical tests of the CT scanner were under manner by late 1970. To capture the image of multiple pieces of the encephalon. the scanner went through a translate-rotate sequence. as illustrated in figure 10. 2. The X-ray beginning and sensor. located on opposite sides of the patient’s caput. were mounted on a gauntry. After each scan. or â€Å"translation. † had generated an X-ray image consisting 160 informations points. the gauntry would revolve 1 ° and another scan would be made. This process would go on through 180 interlingual renditions and rotary motions. hive awaying a sum of about 30. 000 information points. Since the detected strength of an X-ray varies with the stuff through which it passes. the information could be reconstructed by the computing machine into a threedimensional image of the object that distinguished bone. tissue. H2O. fat. and so on. At about the clip of the CT clinical tests. John Powell. once pull offing manager of Texas Instrument’s English subordinate. joined EMI as proficient manager. He shortly became positive that the hapless profitableness of the unmilitary electronics concern was due to the diffusion of the company’s 2. 500-person R A ; D capableness over excessively many diverse small-volume lines. In his words. â€Å"EMI was devoted to excessively many merchandises and dedicated to excessively few. † Because the CT scanner undertaking built on the company’s significant and well-established elect ronics capableness. Powell believed it gave EMI an of import chance to come in an exciting new field. He felt that this was precisely the type of attempt in which the company should be prepared to put several million lbs. Diagnostic Imaging IndustryDuring the first half of the 20th century. diagnostic information about internal variety meats and maps was provided about entirely by conventional X-ray scrutiny. but in the sixtiess hostemostel. com and 1970s. several new imaging techniques emerged. When the CT scanner was announced. three other of import engineerings existed: X ray. atomic. and ultrasound. EMI direction believed its CT scanner would displace bing diagnostic imagination equipment in merely a few applications. specifically head and encephalon imagination. X ray In 1895 Wilhelm Roentgen discovered that beams generated by a cathode beam tubing could perforate solid objects and make an image on movie. Over the following 40 to 50 old ages. X-ray equipment was installed in about every health care installation in the universe. Despite its several restrictions ( chiefly due to the fact that item was obscured when 3-dimensional characteristics were superimposed on a planar image ) . X raies were universally used. In 1966 a Surgeon General’s study estimated that between one-third and one-half of all important medical determinations in the United States depended on reading of X-ray movies. That state entirely had more than 80. 000 X-ray installings in operation. executing about 150 million processs in 1970. The X-ray market was dominated by five major planetary companies. Mhos of West Germany was estimated to hold 22 per centum of the universe market. N. V. Philips of the Netherlands had 18 per centum. and Compagnie Generale de Radiologie ( CG E ) . subordinate of the Gallic elephantine Thomson Brandt. held 16 per centum. Although General Electric had an estimated 30 per centum of the big US market. its weak place abroad gave it merely 15 per centum of the universe market. The 5th largest company was Picker. with 20 per centum of the US market. but less than 12 percent worldwide. The size of the US market for X-ray equipment was estimated at $ 350 million in 1972. with an extra $ 350 million in X-ray supplies. The United States was thought to stand for 35– 40 % of the universe market. Despite the adulthood of the merchandise. the X-ray market was turning by about 10 % yearly in dollar footings during the early 1970s. A conventional X-ray system represented a major capital outgo for a infirmary. with the mean system bing more than $ 100. 000 in 1973.In the mid-1960s a atomic diagnostic imagination process was developed. Radioisotopes with a short radioactive life were projected into the organic structure. detected and monitored on a screen. so recorded on movie or stored on a tape. Still in an early phase of development. this engineering was used to complement or. in some cases. replace a conventional X-ray diagnosing. Both inactive and dynamic images could be obtained. Following the open uping development of this field by Nuclear-Chicago. which sold the first atomic gamma camera in 1962. several other little rivals had entered the field. notably Ohio Nuclear. By the late sixtiess larger companies such as Picker were acquiring involved. and in 1971 GE’s Medical Systems Division announced programs to come in the atomic medical specialty field. As new rivals. big and little. entered the market. competition became more aggressive. The mean atomic camera and informations processing system sold for approximately $ 75. 000. By 1973. cargos of atomic imaging equipment into the US market were estimated to be over $ 50 million. Ultrasound had been used in medical diagnosing since the 1950s. and the engineering advanced significantly in the early 1970s. allowing better-defined images. The technique involves conveying sonic moving ridges and picking up the reverberations. which when converted to electric energy could make images. Air and bone frequently provide an acoustic barrier. restricting the usage of this technique. But because the patient was non exposed to radiation. it was widely used as a diagnostic tool in OBs and gynaecology. In 1973 the ultrasound market was really little. and merely a few little companies were reported in the field. Picker. nevertheless. was rumored to be making research in the country. The cost of the equipment was expected to be less than half that of a atomic camera and support system. and possibly a 3rd to a one-fourth that of an X-ray machine. Because of its size. edification. progressivity. and entree to financess. the US medical market clearly represented the major chance for a new device such as the CT scanner. EMI direction was unsure about the gross revenues potency for their new merchandise. nevertheless. As of 1972. there were about 7. 000 infirmaries in the United States. runing from bantam rural infirmaries with fewer than 10 beds to giant learning establishments with 1. 000 beds or more ( see table 10. 1 ) . Since the monetary value of the EMI Scanner was expected to be around $ 400. 000. merely the largest and financially strongest short-run establishments would be able to afford one. But the company was encouraged by the enthusiasm of the doctors who had seen and worked with the scanner. In the sentiment of one prima American brain doctor. at least 170 machines would be required by major US infirmaries. Indeed. he speculated. the clip might come when a brain doctor would experience ethically compelled to order a CT scan before doing a diagnosing. During the 1960s the radiology sections in many infirmaries were recognized as of import money-making operations. Increasingly. radiotherapists were able to committee equipment makers to construct specially designed ( frequently esoteric ) X-ray systems and applications. As their budgets expanded. the size of the US X ray market grew from $ 50 million in 1958 to $ 350 million in 1972. Of the 15. 000 radiotherapists in the United States. 60 per centum were chiefly based in offices and 40 per centum in infirmaries. Small incursion of private clinics was foreseen for the CT scanner. Apart from these wide statistics.EMI had small ability to calculate the potency of the US market for scanners. EMI’s Investment Decisionconflicting direction positionsBy late 1971 it was clear that the clinical tests were successful and EMI direction had to make up ones mind whether to do the investing required to develop the CT scanner concern. One group of senior directors felt that direct EMI engagement was unwanted for three grounds. First. EMI lacked medical merchandise experience. In the early 1970s EMI offered merely two really little medical merchandises. a patient-monitoring device and an infrared thermography device. which together represented less than 0. 5 per centum of the company’s gross revenues. Second. they argued that the fabrication procedure would be rather different from EMI’s experience. Most of its electronics work had been in the occupation store manner required in bring forthing little Numberss of extremely specialized defence merchandises on cost-plus authorities contracts. In scanner production. most of the constituents were purchased from subco ntractors and had to be integrated into a operation system. Finally. many believed that without a working cognition of the North American market. where most of the demand for scanners was expected to be. EMI might happen it really hard to construct an effectual operation from abrasion. Among the strongest oppositions of EMI’s self-development of this new concern was one of the scanner’s earliest patrons. Dr Broadway. caput of the Central Research Laboratory. He emphasized that EMI’s possible rivals in the field had well greater proficient capablenesss and resources. As the major advocate. John Powell needed converting market information to counter the critics. In early 1972 he asked some of the senior directors how many scanners they thought the company would sell in its first 12 months. Their first estimation was five. Powell told them to believe once more. They came back with a figure of 12. and were once more sent back to reconsider. Finally. with an estimation of 50. Powell felt he could travel to bat for the ?6 million investing. since at this gross revenues degree he could project fine-looking net incomes from twelvemonth one. He so prepared an statement that justified the scanner’s tantrum with EMI’s overall aims. and outli ned a basic scheme for the concern. Powell argued that self-development of the CT scanner represented merely the kind of vehicle EMI had been seeking to supply some focal point to its development attempt. By definition. variegation off from bing product-market countries would travel the company into slightly unfamiliar district. but he steadfastly believed that the fiscal and strategic final payments would be immense. The merchandise offered entree to planetary markets and an entry into the moneymaking medical equipment field. He felt the company’s aim should be to accomplish a significant portion of the universe medical electronics concern non merely in diagnostic imagination. but besides through the extension of its engineerings into computerized patient planning and radiation therapy. Powell claimed that the expertness developed by Hounsfield and his squad. coupled with protection from patents. would give EMI three or four old ages. and possibly many more. to set up a solid market place. He argued that investings should be made rapidly and boldly to maximise the market portion of the EMI scanner before rivals entered. Other options. such as licensing. would hinder the development of the scanner. If the licensees were the major Xray equipment providers. they might non advance the scanner sharply since it would cannibalise their gross revenues of X-ray equipment and consumables. Smaller companies would miss EMI’s sense of committedness and urgency. Besides. licensing would non supply EMI with the major strategic variegation it was seeking. It would be. in Powell’s words. â€Å"selling our birthright. † the proposed schemeBecause the CT scanner incorporated a complex integrating of some engineerings in which EMI had merely limited expertness. Powell proposed that the fabrication scheme should trust to a great extent on outside beginnings of those constituents instead than seeking to develop the expertness internally. This attack would non merely minimise hazard. but would besides do it possible to implement a fabrication plan quickly. He proposed the construct of developing assorted â€Å"centers of excellence† both inside and outside the company. doing each responsible for the continued high quality of the subsystem it manufactured. For illustration. within the EMI UK organisation a unit called SE Labs. which manufactured instruments and shows. would go the centre of excellence for the scanner’s sing console and show control. Pantak. an EMI unit with a capableness in X-ray tubing assembly. would go the centre of excellence for the X-ray coevals and sensing subsystem. An outside seller with which the company had worked in developing the scanner would be the centre of excellence for informations processing. Finally. a freshly created division would be responsible for organizing these subsystem makers. incorporating the assorted constituents. and piecing the concluding scanner at a company installation in the town of Hayes. non far from the CRL site. Powell emphasized that the low initial investing was possible because most of the constituents and subsystems were purchased from contractors and sellers. Even internal centres of excellence such as SE Labs and Pantak assembled their subsystems from purchased constituents. Overall. outside sellers accounted for 75–80 per centum of the scanner’s fabrication cost. Although Powell felt his agreement greatly reduced EMI’s hazard. the ?6 hostemostel. com million investing was a significant 1 for the company. stand foring about half the financess available for capital investing over the approaching twelvemonth. ( See exhibit 10. 2 for a balance sheet and exhibit 10. 3 for a jutting financess flow. ) The engineering scheme was to maintain CRL as the company’s centre of excellence for design and package expertness. and to utilize the significant net incomes Powell was projecting from even the earliest gross revenues to keep technological leading place. Powell would personally head up a squad to develop a selling scheme. Clearly. the United States had to be the chief focal point of EMI’s selling activity. Its neuroradiologists were regarded as universe leaders and tended to welcome technological invention. Furthermore. its establishments were more commercial in their mentality than those in other states and tended to hold more available financess. Powell planned to put up a US gross revenues subordinate every bit shortly as possible. enrolling gross revenues and service forces familiar with the North American health care market. Given the involvement shown to day of the month in the EMI scanner. he did non believe there would be much trouble in deriving the attending and involvement of the medical community. Geting the $ 400. 000 orders. nevertheless. would be more of a challenge. In simple footings. Powell’s gross revenues scheme was to acquire machines into a few esteemed mention infirmaries. so construct from that base. the determinationIn March 1972 EMI’s main executive. John Read. considered Powell’s proposal in readying for a board meeting. Be this the variegation chance he had been trusting for? What were the hazards? Could they be managed? How? If he decided to endorse the proposal. what sort of an execution plan would be necessary to guarantee its eventual success? Case BThe twelvemonth 1977 looked like it would be a really good one for EMI Medical Inc. . a North American subordinate of EMI Ltd. EMI’s CT scanner had met with tremendous success in the American market. In the three old ages since the scanner’s debut. EMI medical electronics gross revenues had grown to ?42 million. Although this represented merely 6 per centum of entire gross revenues. this new concern contributed pretax net incomes of ?12. 5 million. about 20 per centum of the corporate sum ( exhibit 10. 4 ) . EMI Medical Inc. was thought to be responsible for about 80 per centum of entire scanner volume. And with an order backlog of more than 300 units. the hereafter seemed rose-colored. Despite this formidable success. senior direction in both the subordinate and the parent company were concerned about several developments. First. this fast-growth field had attracted more than a twelve new entrants in the past two old ages. and technological progresss were happeni ng quickly. At the same clip. the turning political argument over infirmary cost containment frequently focused on $ 500. 000 CT scanners as an illustration of questionable infirmary disbursement. Finally. EMI was get downing to experience some internal organisational strains. Entry Decision merchandise launchFollowing months of argument among EMI’s top direction. the determination to travel in front with the EMI Scanner undertaking was assured when John Read. the company CEO. gave his support to Dr Powell’s proposal. In April 1972 a formal imperativeness proclamation was greeted by a response that could merely be described as overpowering. EMI was flooded with enquiries from the medical and fiscal communities. and from most of the big diagnostic imagination companies desiring to licence the engineering. enter into joint ventures. or at least administer the merchandise. The response was that the company had decided to come in the concern straight itself. Immediately action was implemented to set Dr Powell’s fabrication scheme into operation. Manufacturing installations were developed and provide contracts drawn up with the aim of get downing cargos within 12 months. In May. Godfrey Hounsfield. the superb EMI scientist who had developed the scanner. was dispatched to the US accompanied by a taking English brain doctor. The American specializers with whom they spoke confirmed that the scanner had great medical importance. Interest was running high in the medical community. In December. EMI mounted a show at the one-year meeting of the Radiological Society of North America ( RSNA ) . The exhibit was the high spot of the show. and boosted management’s assurance to set up a US gross revenues company to perforate the American medical market. us market entry In June 1973. with an impressive heap of gross revenues leads and enquiries. a little gross revenues office was established in Reston. Virginia. place of the freshly appointed US gross revenues subdivision director. Mr Gus Pyber. Earlier that month the first North American caput scanner had been installed at the esteemed Mayo Clinic. with a 2nd machine promised to the Massachusetts General Hospital for tests. Interest was high. and the new gross revenues force had small trouble acquiring into the offices of taking radiotherapists and brain doctors. By the terminal of the twelvemonth. nevertheless. Mr Pyber had been fired in a difference over appropriate disbursal degrees. and James Gallagher. a former selling director with a major drug company. was hired to replace him. One of Gallagher’s first stairss was to convert the company that the Chicago country was a far better location for the US office. It allowed better service of a national market. was a major centre for medical electronics companies. and had more convenient linkages with London. This last point was of import since all major strategic and policy determinations were being made straight by Dr Powell in London. During 1974. Gallagher concentrated on recruiting and developing his three-man gross revenues force and two-man service organisation. The cost of keeping each salesman on the route was estimated at $ 50. 000. while a serviceman’s wage and disbursals at that clip were about $ 35. 000 yearly. The production rate for the scanner was running at a rate of merely three or four machines a month. and Gallagher saw small point in developing a immense gross revenues force to sell a merchandise for which supply was limited. and involvement apparently boundless. In this seller’s market the company developed some policies that were new to the industry. Most notably. they required that the client sedimentation tierce of the purchase monetary value with the order to vouch a topographic point in the production agenda. Gross saless leads and questions were followed up when the gross revenues force could acquire to them. and the general attitude of the company seemed to hold slightly of a â€Å"take it or go forth it† tone. It was in this period that EMI developed a repute for haughtiness in some parts of the medical profession. However. by June 1974 the company had delivered 35 scanners at $ 390. 000 each. and had another 60 orders in manus. Developing Challengescompetitory challengeToward the terminal of 1974. the first competitory scanners were announced. Unlike the EMI scanner. the new machines were designed to scan the organic structure instead than the caput. The Acta- Scanner had been developed at Georgetown University’s Medical Center and was manufactured by a little Maryland company called Digital Information Sciences Corporation ( DISCO ) . Technologically. it offered small progress over the EMI scanner except for one of import characteristic. Its gauntry design would suit a organic structure instead than a caput. While specifications on scan clip and image composing were indistinguishable to those of the EMI scanner. the $ 298. 000 monetary value tickets gave the Acta-Scanner a large advantage. peculiarly with smaller infirmaries and private practicians. The DeltaScan offered by Ohio Nuclear ( ON ) represented an even more formidable challenge. This caput and organic structure scanner had 256 ? 256 pels compared with EMI’s 160 ? 160. and promised a 21/2-minute scan instead than the 41/2-minute scan clip offered by EMI. ON offered these superior characteristics on a unit priced $ 5. 000 below the EMI scanner at $ 385. 000. Many directors at EMI were surprised by the velocity with which these merchandises had appeared. hardly two old ages after the EMI scanner was exhibited at the RSNA meeting in Chicago. and 18 months after the first machine was installed in the Mayo Clinic. The beginning of the challenge was besides interesting. DISCO was a bantam private company. and ON contributed about 20 per centum of its parent Technicare’s 1974 gross revenues of $ 50 million. To some. the biggest surprise was how closely these competitory machines resembled EMI’s ain scanner. The complex wall of patents had non provided a really abiding defence. ON tackled the issue straight in its 1975 one-year study. After denoting that $ 882. 200 had been spent in Technicare’s R A ; D Center to develop DeltaScan. the study stated: Patents have non played a important function in the development of Ohio Nuclear’s merchandise line. and it is non believed that the cogency or invalidness of any patents known to be is material to its current market place. However. the engineerings on which its merchandises are based are sufficiently complex and application of patent jurisprudence sufficiently indefinite that this belief is non free from all uncertainty. The challenge represented by these new competitory merchandises caused EMI to rush up the proclamation of the organic structure scanner Dr Hounsfield had been working on. The new CT 5000 theoretical account incorporated a second-generation engineering in which multiple beams of radiation were shot at multiple sensors. instead than the individual pencil beam and the individual sensor of the original scanner ( see exhibit 10. 5 ) . This technique allowed the gauntry to revolve 10 ° instead than l ° after each interlingual rendition. cutting scan clip from 41/2 proceedingss to 20 seconds. In add-on. the multiple-beam emanation besides permitted a finer image declaration by increasing the figure of pels from 160 ? 160 to 320 ? 320. Priced over $ 500. 000. the CT 5000 received a standing ovation when Hounsfield demonstrated it at the radiological meetings held in Bermuda in May 1975. Despite EMI’s reaffirmation of its leading place. aggressive competitory activity continued. In March 1975. Pfizer Inc. . the $ 1. 5 billion drug giant. announced it had acquired the fabrication and selling rights for the Acta-Scanner. EMI was so runing at an one-year production rate of 150 units. and ON had announced programs to duplicate capacity to 12 units per month by early 1976. Pfizer’s capacity programs were unknown. The most dramatic competitory disclosure came at the one-year RSNA meeting in December 1975. when six new rivals displayed CT scanners. Although none of the fledglings offered immediate bringing. all were booking orders with bringing dates up to 12months out on the footing of their spec sheets and paradigm or mock-up equipment exhibits. Some of the new entrants ( Syntex. Artronix. and Neuroscan ) were smaller companies. but others ( General Electric. Picker. and Varian ) were major medical electronics rivals. Possibly most impressive was the General Electric CT/T scanner. which took the infant engineering into its 3rd coevals ( see exhibit 10. 6 ) . By utilizing a 30 °-wide pulsed fan X-ray beam. the GE scanner could avoid the time-consuming â€Å"translate-rotate† sequence of the firstand second-generation scanners. A individual uninterrupted 360 ° expanse could be completed in 4. 8 seconds. and the resulting image was reconstructed by the computing machine in a 320 ? 320 pel matrix on a cathode beam tubing. The unit was priced at $ 615. 000. Clinical tests were scheduled for January. and cargo of production units was being quoted for mid-1976. The reaching of GE on the skyline signaled the beginning of a new competitory game. With a 300-person gross revenues force and a service web of 1. 200. GE clearly had selling musculus. They had reputedly exhausted $ 15 million developing their third-generation scanner. and were go oning to pass at a rate of $ 5 million yearly to maintain in front technologically. During 1975. one industry beginning estimated. about 150 new scanners were installed in the US. and more than twice as many orders entered. ( Orders were house. since most were secured with brawny front-end deposits. ) Overall. orders were split reasonably equally between encephalon and organic structure scanners. EMI was thought to hold accounted for more than 50 per centum of orders taken in 1975. ON for about 30 per centum. Market size and growingAccurate appraisals of market size. growing rate. and competitors’ portions were hard to obtain. The undermentioned represents a sample of the widely changing prognosiss made in late 1975: Wall Street was clearly enamored with the industry chances ( Technicare’s stock monetary value rose from 5 to 22 in six months ) and analysts were foretelling an one-year market potency of $ 500 million to $ 1 billion by 1980. Frost and Sullivan. nevertheless. saw a US market of merely $ 120 million by 1980. with 10 old ages of cumulative gross revenues merely making $ 1 billion by 1984 ( 2. 500 units at $ 400. 000 ) . Some prima radiotherapists suggested that CT scanners could be standard equipment in all short-run infirmaries with 200 beds or more by 1985. Technicare’s president. Mr R. T. Grimm. calculate a world-wide market of over $ 700 million by 1980. of which $ 400 million would be in the US. Despite the proficient restrictions of its first-generation merchandise. Pfizer said it expected to sell more than 1. 500 units of its Acta-Scanner over the following five old ages. Within EMI. market prognosiss had changed well. By late 1975. the estimation of the US market had been boosted to 350 units a twelvemonth. of which EMI hoped to retain a 50 per centum portion. Management was acutely cognizant of the trouble of calculating in such a disruptive environment. nevertheless. international enlargementNew rivals besides challenged EMI’s places in markets outside the US. Siemens. the $ 7 billion West German company. became ON’s international distributer. The distribution understanding appeared to be one of short-run convenience for both parties. since Siemens acknowledged that it was developing its ain CT scanner. Philips. excessively. had announced its purpose to come in the field. Internationally. EMI had maintained its basic scheme of traveling direct to the national market instead than working through local spouses or distributers. Although all European gross revenues had originally been handled out of the UK office. it rapidly became apparent that local service staffs were required in most states. Soon separate subordinates were established in most Continental European states. typically with a twosome of salesmen. and three or four military mans. Elsewhere in the universe. salesmen were frequently attached to EMI’s bing music organisation in that state ( e. g. . in South Africa. Australia. and Latin America ) . In Japan. nevertheless. EMI signed a distribution understanding with Toshiba which. in October 1975. submitted the largest individual order to day of the month: a petition for 33 scanners. EMI in 1976: Scheme and Challengesemi’s state of affairs in 1976By 1976 the CT scanner concern was germinating quickly. but. as the consequences indicated. EMI had done highly good financially ( exhibit 10. 5 ) . In reexamining developments since the US market entry. the followers was clear: While smaller rivals had challenged EMI slightly earlier than might hold been expected. none of the large diagnostic imagination companies had brought its scanner to market. even four old ages after the original EMI scanner proclamation. While engineering was germinating quickly. the expertness of Hounsfield and his CRL group. and the aggressive reinvestment of much of the early net incomes in R A ; D. gave EMI a strong technological place. While market size and growing were extremely unsure. the potency was unimpeachably much larger than EMI had forecast in their early programs. In all. EMI was good established. with a strong and turning gross revenues volume and a good proficient repute. The company was unimpeachably the industry leader. Nonetheless. in the visible radiation of all the developments. the strategic undertakings confronting EMI in 1976 differed well from those of earlier old ages. The undermentioned paragraphs outline the most of import challenges and jobs confronting the company in this period. strategic precedencesEMI’s first gross revenues precedence was to protect its bing extremely seeable and esteemed client base from rivals. When its second-generation scanner was introduced in mid-1975. EMI promised to upgrade without charge the first-generation equipment already purchased by its established clients. Although each of these 120 ascents was estimated to be EMI $ 60. 000 in constituents and installing costs. the US gross revenues organisation felt that the disbursal was indispensable to keep the assurance and good religion of this of import nucleus group of clients. To keep its leading image. the US company besides expanded its service organisation well. Get downing in early 1976. new regional and territory gross revenues and service offices were opened with the aim of supplying clients with the best service in the industry. A typical one-year service contract cost the hospital $ 40. 000 per scanner. By year’s terminal. the company boasted 20 service centre s with 150 service applied scientists – a ratio that represented one military man for every two or three machines installed. The gross revenues force by this clip had grown to 20. and was much more client oriented. Another of import undertaking was to better bringing public presentation. The interval between order and promised bringing had been lengthening ; at the same clip. promised bringing day of the months were frequently missed. By late 1975. it was non unusual for a 6-month promise to change over into a 12- or 15month existent bringing clip. Fortunately for EMI. all CT makers were in backorder and were offering drawn-out bringing day of the months. However. EMI’s hapless public presentation in meeting promised day of the months was aching its repute. The company responded by well spread outing its production installations. By mid-1976 there were six fabrication locations in the UK. yet because of go oning jobs with component providers. combined capacity for caput and organic structure scanners was estimated at less than 20 units a month.Organizational and forces issuesAs the US gross revenues organisation became progressively frustrated. they began pressing top direction to fabricate scanners in North America. Believing that the merchandise had reached the necessary degree of adulthood. Dr Powell judged that the clip was mature to set up a US works to manage at least concluding assembly and trial operations. A Northbrook. Illinois site was chosen. Powell had become EMI’s pull offing manager and was more determined than of all time to do the new medical electronics concern a success. A capable director was urgently needed to head the concern. peculiarly in position of the rapid developments in the critical North American market. Consequently. Powell was delighted when Normand Provost. who had been his foreman at Texas Instruments. contacted him at the Bermuda radiological meeting in March 1975. He was hired with the hope that he could construct a stronger. more incorporate US company. With the Northbrook works scheduled to get down operations by mid-1976. Normand Provost began engaging skilled production forces. A Northbrook merchandise development centre was besides a vision of Provost’s to let EMI to pull on US proficient expertness and experience in solid province electronics and informations processing. and the company began seeking people with strong technological and scientific backgrounds. Having hired Provost. Dr Powell made several of import organisational alterations aimed at easing the medical electronics business’s growing and development. In the UK. he announced the creative activity of a separate medical electronics group. This allowed the separate operating companies. EMI Medical Ltd ( antecedently known as the X-Ray Systems Division ) . Pantak ( EMI ) Ltd. SE Labs ( EMI ) Lt. . and EMI Meterflow Ltd. to be grouped together under a individual group executive. John Willsher. ( See exhibit 10. 6. ) At last. a more incorporate scanner concern seemed to be emerging organizationally. The US gross revenues subordinate was folded into a new company. EMI Medical Inc. . but continued to run as a separate entity. The purpose was to develop this company as an integrated diversified medical electronics operation. Jim Gallagher. the general director of the US operations. was fired and Bob Hagglund became president of EMI Medical Inc. While Gallagher had been an effectual salesman. Powell thought the company needed a more rounded general director in its following stage of enlargement. Hagglund. antecedently executive frailty president of G. D. Searle’s diagnostic concern. seemed to hold the broader background and mentality required to pull off a larger incorporate operation. He reported through Provost back to Dr Powell in the UK. While Provost’s initial assignment was to set up the new fabrication and research installations in the US. it was widely assumed within EMI that he was being groomed to take duty for the company’s medical electronics concern s worldwide. However. in April 1976. while sing London to discourse advancement. Provost died of a bosom onslaught. As a consequence. the US and UK organisations reported individually to Dr Powell. merchandise variegationSince EMI wished to utilize the scanner as a agency to go a major force in medical electronics. Powell argued that some bold external moves were needed to protect the company’s leading place. In March 1976. EMI acquired for $ 2 million ( ?1. 1 million ) SHM Nuclear Corporation. a California-based company that had developed additive gas pedals for malignant neoplastic disease therapy and computerized radiation therapy be aftering systems. Although the SHM merchandise line needed significant farther development. the hope was that associating such systems to the CT scanner would allow a synchronised location and intervention of malignant neoplastic disease. Six months subsequently EMI paid ?6. 5 million to get an extra 60 per centum of Nuclear Enterprises Ltd. an Edinburgh-based provider of ultrasound equipment. In the 1976 one-year study. Sir John Read. now EMI’s president. reaffirmed his support for Dr Powell’s scheme: We have every ground to believe that this new grouping of scientific and technological resources will turn out of national benefit in procuring a turning portion of worldwide markets for high-technology products†¦ Future ProspectsAt the stopping point of 1976. EMI’s medical electronics concern was transcending all outlooks. In merely three old ages. gross revenues of electronics merchandises had risen from ?84 million to ?207 million ; a big portion of this addition was due to the scanner. Even more impressive. net incomes of the electronics line had risen from ?5. 2 million in 1972/73 to ?26. 4 million in 1975/76. leaping from 16 to 40 per centum of the corporate sum. Rather than dwindling. involvement in scanners seemed to be increasing. Although the company had sold around 450 scanners over the past three old ages ( over 300 in the US entirely ) . its order backlog was estimated to be 300 units. At the December 1976 RSNA meeting. 120 of the 280 documents presented were related to CT scanning. As he reviewed the medical electronics concern he had built. Dr Powell was by and large pleased with the manner in which the company had met the challenges of being a innovator in a new industry section. However. there were several developments that he felt would necessitate considerable attending over the following few old ages. First. Powell felt that competitory activity would go on to show a challenge ; second. some alterations in the US regulative environment concerned him ; and eventually. he was cognizant that the recent organisation alterations had created some strains. competitory jobsBy the terminal of 1976. EMI had delivered 450 of the 650-odd scanners installed worldwide. yet its market portion had dropped to 56 per centum in 1975/76 ( 198 of 352 scanners sold that June-to-June period were EMI’s ) . The company gained some solace from the fact that despite their premium pricing scheme and their bringing jobs. they had conceded less than half the entire market to the combined competitory field. They besides felt some sense of security in the 300 orders they held expecting bringing. Nonetheless. Sir John Read was clearly concerned: [ We are good cognizant of the developing competition. Our research plan is being to the full sustained to guarantee our continued leadership†¦ In mid-1976. the company announced its purpose â€Å"to protect its innovations and asseverate its patent strength. † and later filed suit against Ohio Nuclear claiming patent violation. However. at the same clip. EMI issued a statement proclaiming that â€Å"it was the company’s want to do its pioneering scanner patents available to all under suited licensing agreements. † At the one-year RSNA meeting in December 1976. 16 rivals exhibited scanners. The year’s new entrants ( including CGR. the Gallic X-ray giant ; Hitachi from Japan ; and G. D. Searle. the US drug and infirmary equipment company ) were non yet doing bringings. nevertheless. The industry’s possible production capacity was now estimated to be over 900 units yearly. GE’s much-publicized entry was already six months behind their proclaimed bringing day of the month. but it was strongly rumored that production cargos of GE’s third-generation scanner were approximately to ge t down. EMI Medical Inc. awaited that event with some trepidation. ( A sum-up of major rivals and their state of affairss as of 1976 is presented in table 10. 2. ) Regulatory jobsBy mid-1976 there were indicants that authorities might seek to exercise a tighter control over hospital disbursement in general. and purchase of CT scanners in peculiar. The quickly intensifying cost of health care had been a political issue for old ages. and the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 needed provinces to command the development of dearly-won or unneeded wellness services through a mechanism known as the Certificate of Need ( CON ) process. If they wished to measure up for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursements. health care installations were required to subject certification to their state’s section of wellness to warrant major capital outgos ( typically in surplus of $ 100. 000 ) . Before 1976. the CON processs had by and large been simply an administrative hindrance to the procedure of selling a scanner. detaining but non forestalling the mandate of financess. However. by 1976. the cost of medical attention represented 8 per centum of the gross national merchandise and Jimmy Carter made control of the â€Å"skyrocketing costs of healthcare† a major run issue. One of the most often cited illustrations of waste was the proliferation of CT scanners. It was argued that this $ 500. 000 device had become a symbol of prestigiousness and edification in the medical community. so that every establishment wanted its ain scanner. even if a adjacent installation had one that was grossly underutilized. In response to heightened public consciousness of the issue. five provinces declared a moratorium on the purchase of new scanners. including California. which had accounted for over 20 per centum of entire US scanner arrangements to day of the month. In November. Jimmy Carter was elected president. organisational jobs Possibly most troublesome to Dr Powell were the organisational jobs. Tensions within the EMI organisation had been developing for some clip. focus oning on the issues of fabrication and merchandise design. Directors in the US company felt that they had small control over fabrication agendas and small input into merchandise design. despite the fact that they were responsible for 80 per centum of corporate scanner gross revenues. In their position. the company’s current market place was being eroded by the declining fabrication bringing public presentation from the UK. while its longer-term chances were threatened by the competitory challenges to EMI’s technological leading. Although the Northbrook works had been completed in late 1976. United states directors were still non satisfied they had the necessary control over production. Arguing that the quality of subassemblies and constituents shipped from the UK was deteriorating and bringing promises were going even more undependable. they began look intoing surrogate supply beginnings in the US. UK-based fabrication directors felt that much of the duty for backlogs lay with the merchandise applied scientists and the gross revenues organisations. Their undependable gross revenues prognosiss and invariably altering design specifications had badly disrupted production agendas. The worst constrictions involved outside providers and subcontractors that were unable to pitch up and down overnight. Complete systems could be held up for hebdomads or months expecting a individual simple constituent. As the Northbrook works became progressively independent. US directors sensed that the UK workss felt less duty for them. In tight supply state of affairss they felt there was a inclination to transport to European or other export clients foremost. Some United states directors besides believed that constituents were progressively shipped from UK workss without the same stiff concluding cheques they usually received. The premise was that the US could make their ain QC checking. it was asserted. Both these averments were strongly denied by the English group. Nonetheless. Bob Hagglund shortly began pressing Dr Powell to allow EMI Medical Inc. become a more independent fabrication operation instead than merely a concluding assembly works for UK constituents. This chance disturbed John Willsher. pull offing manager of EMI Medical Ltd. who argued that spliting fabrication operations could intend doubling overhead and distributing bing expertness excessively thin. Others felt that the â€Å"bootleg development† of alternate supply beginnings showed a discourtesy for the â€Å"center of excellence† construct. and could easy compromise the ability of Pantak ( X-ray engineering ) and SE Labs ( shows ) to stay at the head of engineering. Product development issues besides created some organisational tenseness. The US gross revenues organisation knew that GE’s impressive new third-generation â€Å"fan beam† scanner would shortly be ready for bringing. and found clients hesitant to perpetrate to EMI’s new CT 5005 until the GE merchandise came out. For months teletypewriters had been fluxing from Northbrook to EMI’s Central Research Laboratories inquiring if drastic decreases in scan clip might be possible torun into the GE menace. Meanwhile. scientists at CRL felt that US CT competition was developing into a specifications war based on the incorrect issue. scan clip. Shorter elapsed times meant less image blurring. but in the tradeoff between scan clip and image declaration. EMI applied scientists had preferred to concentrate on better-quality images. They felt that the 20-second scan offered by EMI scanners made practical sense since a patient could typically keep his breath that long while being diagnosed. CRL staff were researching some wholly new imaging constructs and hoped to hold a wholly new scanning engineering ready to market in three or four old ages. Dr Hounsfield had conducted experiments with the fan beam construct in the early 1970s and was disbelieving of its ability to bring forth good-quality images. To utilize sodium iodide sensors similar to those in bing scanners would be cost prohibitory in the big Numberss necessary to pick up a wide scan ; to utilize other stuffs such as xenon gas would take to quality and stableness jobs. in Hounsfield’s position. Since GE and others offering third-generation equipment had non yet delivered commercial machines. he felt small inducement to airt his staff to these countries already researched and rejected. There were many other demands on the clip and attending of Hounsfield and his staff. all of which seemed of import for the company. They were in changeless demand by technicians to cover with major jobs that arose that cipher else could work out. Gross saless people wanted him to speak to their largest and most esteemed clients. since a visit by Dr Hounsfield could frequently swing an of import sale. They were besides involved in internal preparation on all new merchandises. The scientific community wanted them to show documents and give talks. And progressively. Dr Hounsfield found himself in a public dealingss function as he accepted awards from all over the Earth. The impact was to greatly heighten EMI’s repute and to reenforce its image as the leader in the field. When it appeared that CRL was unwilling or unable to do the merchandise changes the US organisation felt it needed. Hagglund made the bold proposal that the freshly established research research labs in Northbrook take duty for developing a three- to five-second-scan â€Å"fan beam†-type scanner. Dr Powell agreed to analyze the suggestion. but was happening it hard to measure the comparative virtues of the US subsidiary’s positions and the CRL scientists’ sentiments. By year’s terminal. Dr Powell had still been unable to happen anybody to take charge of the worldwide medical electronics concern. By default. the chief decision-making forum became the Medical Group Review Committee ( MGRC ) . a group of cardinal line and staff directors which met. monthly at first. to assist set up and reexamine strategic determinations. Among the issues discussed by this commission were the fabrication and merchandise development determinations that had produced tensenesss between the US and UK directors. Powell had hoped that the MGRC would assist construct communications and consensus among his directors. but it shortly became apparent that this end was unrealistic. In the words of one director stopping point to the events: The job was there was no common regard between directors with similar duties. Medical Ltd was resentful of Medical Inc. ’s push for greater independency. and were non traveling to travel out of their manner to assist the Americans win. As the concern grew larger and more complex. Dr Powell’s ability to move both as corporate Chief executive officer and caput of the worldwide medical concern diminished. Increasingly. he was forced to trust on the MGRC to turn to runing jobs every bit good as strategic issues. The coordination job became so complex that. by early 1977. there were four subcommittees of the MGRC. each with representatives of the US and UK organisations. and each meeting monthly on one side of the Atlantic or the other. Committees included Manufacturing and Operations. Product Planning and Resources. Selling and Gross saless Programs. and Service and Spares. powell’s jobs As the new twelvemonth opened. Dr Powell reviewed EMI’s medical electronics concern. How good was it positioned? Where were the major menaces and chances? What were the cardinal issues he should cover with in 1977? Which should he undertake foremost. and how? These were the issues he turned over in his head as he prepared to observe down his programs for 1977. Assistant Professor Christopher A. Bartlett prepared this instance as a footing for category treatment instead than to exemplify either effectual or uneffective handling of an administrative state of affairs. Information was obtained from public beginnings and 3rd parties. Although employees of the capable company discussed with the research worker events referred to in the instance. they did non take part in the readying of the papers. The analysis. decisions. and sentiments stated do non needfully represent those of the company. its employees or agents. or employees or agents of its subordinates. Thorn EMI PLC. on its ain behalf and on behalf of all or any of its present or former subordinates. disclaims any duty for the affairs included or referred to in the survey.

Consumerism and Identity Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 10

Consumerism and Identity - Essay Example In this paper I will qualify the statement that the capitalist commercial culture has been blamed for the bad experiences in the society. Argument for the Claim The society has continually faced problems that range from economic to political, and fingers point to the commercial culture of capitalism. Profit motive in the commercial sector plays an important role on food that people eat and to a great extent account for effects of other consumables. Emergence of economic concepts of cost minimization towards optimal profits play a core role as capitalists seeks less costly strategies to productions and marketing strategies for market control. In the food industry, for example, industrialization has transformed eating habits to commercially processed foods that are rich in chemicals and fats and expose consumers to eating disorders such as overweight. Using the media to penetrate into new markets also influences consumers towards the capitalists’ products and increases incidence s of effects of industrial products (Twitchell 1). Economic effects of capitalism also support the claim that the commercial culture is responsible for depression and associated disorders among members of the society. Unlike in socialist culture where the society owns resources and collectivism ensures needs of every member of the society, capitalism concentrates excessive resources on a few individuals while a majority of members of the society remain in poverty and have to struggle for their needs. Human suffering due to lack of basic needs or wants therefore flourish in the society while a non-capitalist system would have resolved such conditions. The condition worsens by capitalists’ selfish interest that seeks to increase the capitalists’ possession at the expense of the working class that mainly lives in poverty. Capitalist commercial culture has also threatened social cultures and cultural figures through undermining cultural values. Competitiveness in the corpo rate sector and the profit orientation of capitalists has for example promoted creativity into cultural shifts in what appears as better practices and utilities. Cultures and their benefits to the society have suffered from the developments as they become inferior and lose value. High level of competition in the market and self-interest has also promoted ills such as corruption and associated consequences in substandard products that risk consumers’ lives and undermine economic growth (Twitchell 1). Established criticisms of the commercial culture also support Twitchell’s position that the culture does not benefit the society. Some oppressive conditions are manageable, especially through collective responsibility as observed in socialist culture, but self-centered interest in the capitalist culture overlooks strategies for resolving the conditions. Widening gap between economic classes is an example and explains why the poor get poorer and the rich continue to amass we alth. Capitalistic culture also undermines efforts for harmonizing living standards in the economy and promotes such acts as discrimination and exploitation to promote suffering and stress.

The Colonization of America Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

The Colonization of America - Essay Example Economics was the driving force behind the move to the colonies and religion was the prime motivation. After a millennium of rule over Europe, the Catholic Church had come under increasing pressure brought on by its abuse of power and unpopular doctrines. During the reign of King Henry the VIII, England split from the Catholic Church and changed the national religion to Protestant. After Henry's death, the country switched between Catholic and Protestant as the rulers changed. When Mary became queen in 1553 she banished, persecuted, or killed many people who were not Catholics. When the Protestant religion came back in favor, there were even more dramatic splits in religion as radical Protestants objected to some of the fundamentals of the church. These splits in the churches carried on into the 17th century and eventually fomented into the English Civil War. England was being swept up into the fervor that had engulfed the rest of Europe decades earlier. The English Civil War, also known as the Puritan Movement, had its beginnings with John Calvin in the 16th century. The puritans objected to the modern Protestant church of the 17th century and insisted the church follow the Calvinist doctrine. The strict teachings of Calvinism earned the followers the name of reformer and non-conformer. These Puritan reformers, outlawed in their own country, were seeking a new place where they could practice their religion with freedom. The Americas were the ideal location, and the economic situation at the time made the journey a necessary reality. Others seeking wealth, resources, and land would facilitate their voyage across the sea. During the period of religious upheaval, England was also experiencing a dramatic shift in its economic system. By the beginning of the 17th century, the population has swelled and unemployment was escalating. Peasants and laborers moved to the city and were met with impoverished conditions. The increase in population placed a greater demand on goods and services and resulted in widespread scarcities across England. With a high demand and short supply, inflation set in and resulted in the Price Revolution. Landlords found that they could make more profit during this period of high inflation by producing cash goods rather than renting to tenants. In a process called enclosing, the landowners would evict the current tenants and enclose the property to produce commercial commodities. Though this was good for the economy in that it produced more goods and eased inflation, it resulted in greater poverty for the farmer tenants and increased unemployment in England's cities. These changing economic systems caused people to seek wealth in new areas such as the Americas. America offered the poor an opportunity to own land and the investor the chance to capitalize their fortunes. England saw migration as a means to ease the overpopulation and the overburdened demand for goods. The impoverished in England were also the most disenchanted and dissatisfied class. They were drawn to radical religious and philosophical doctrines and looked for leadership in these disciplines. Drawn by the promise of prosperity in a new land, they were eager to begin a pilgrimage to a new home. The promise of land ownership and religious freedom combined to make the migration to the Americas possible. The new immigrants to America began

Digital Bangladesh Essay Example for Free

Digital Bangladesh Essay Bangladesh is resounding with the target of achieving digital Bangladesh. Broadly speaking, a digital society ensures an Information and communication Technology (ICT) driven knowledge-based where information will be readily available on line and where all possible tasks of the government, semi-government and also private spheres will be processed using the modern technology. So, a digital Bangladesh must guarantee efficient and effective use of modern ICT in all spheres of the society with a view to establishing good governance. In other word, making Bangladesh a digital one, we have to establish technology driven e-governance, e-commerce, e-production, e-agriculture, e-health etc. , in the society emphasizing the overall development of the common people. Building strong ICT infrastructure is the pre-requisite for making Bangladesh a digital one. For this, we need to focus on the following relevant issues assessing the harsh reality that hinders our development in this context. Latest statistics reveal that Bangladesh faces a power deficit of up to 200 MW against a demand of 5000 MW daily. It may be noted that for proper ICT development an uninterrupted power supply is a must. For the ICT development Internet users of the country must be increased. In this case our position is the worst one among the South Asian countries. From different sources, it has been learnt that, English language literacy rate in Bangladesh is lesser than one percent. Whereas, English language literacy rates in India and Pakistan are 60% and 20% respectively. There is a strong correlation between English literacy and ICT development in the present context of Globalization. In the arena of ICT English has become the Lingua-Franca. Though the above accounts seem to be frustrating one, these can be easily overcome within a reasonable span of time if we can establish good governance in the country. For making a digital Bangladesh by 2021, the government must address the above stated issues effectively and efficiently in transparent manners. In many cases we need to reformulate our national policy (e. g. education policy, ICT policy) in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals. It the leaders of our country objectively guide this generation, they can do wonder for the nation.

My Philosophy of Education Essay -- essays papers

My Philosophy of Education A philosophy of education is very important in the teaching profession. All teachers have their own unique philosophies. My personal philosophy of education contains many different aspects. For instance, in my opinion all teachers are valuable. The younger the teacher the more current the knowledge, the older the teacher the better the wisdom. Determining a personal philosophy of education is a very important part in becoming a teacher. One day, I hope to be able to utilize my philosophy. My philosophy of education begins with my ideal classroom. Inside my classroom, I would like the children to feel comfortable with themselves, their peers, and myself. An ideal classroom for any teacher and myself is a classroom large in size. I would utilize a large classroom by putting one or two long tables towards the back of the classroom, for various special projects, group work, story time, sharing time, etc. All of the students desks in the classroom will form a huge semi-circle with enough room between each desk, so each student has their individual space. I will let my student choose where they want my desk to be in the classroom. The walls in the classroom will be decorated with the student’s drawings and what they would like on the walls, if allowed by school codes. In my opinion a room like this creates conversation, individuality, gives the students a sense of freedom, make the student feel like it is their class, as well as helping to gai...

Yupik (Eskimo)

The Yupik or the Eskimo is famously known for its ice dwellings known as igloos. Their adaptive characteristics to environment especially in the snow caps are very extraordinary. This paper shows the background including the origin and expansion of this group of people. It also tackles the culture and the composition of the Eskimo tribe as well as their ways of living. Background on the Yupik People The Eskimo is a group of interrelated tribes who occupies the location from Siberian Arctic up to Canada and Greenland. The word Eskimo comes from the Algonquin language which means â€Å"raw flesh eaters†. The Yupik are classified as a sub-group of the Eskimos and also referred to as the Siberian Yupik or Siberian Eskimos (Vajda). The Yupik people spend their time living in the along the watershed coasts of the rivers of Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers. These rivers flow towards to the west passing by southwest Alaska and ends at the Bering Sea. The Yup’iks are regarded as the most numbered groups among the Inuit groups in Alaska. Origin and Expansion. The ancestors of the Yupik people are believed to have reached the ice caps of Alaska and Russia during the third and final migration from Asia which occurred ten to eleven thousand years ago at the latter part of the Ice Age. Edward Vajda cites that archeological and linguistic evidences show that the direct ancestors of the Yupik people over the Bering Strait through the presence of the Bering land that time. Their ancestors are said to have lived in the areas of Siberian Bering and Arctic Sea coasts before the arrival of Chukchi and Korak tribes from the South From their base in the current location in West Alaska, they separated into two (2) distinct groups: (1) the Eskimos, and (2) the Aleuts. After some time, explorers, traders and settlers from Europe and Russia came during the 1800’s. However, this event created setbacks to the Yupik because their communities suffered deadly epidemic diseases like smallpox, influenza, and tuberculosis. Ways of Living The homes of Yupik are designed to be flat, with treeless tundra landscapes with multiple numbers of lakes. In the previous times, they were found residing in houses made of wood and whalebones as the fundamental structures. The walrus skins are covered into the sides and the insides were lightened by bowl shaped clay lamps, or those made of carved stones. During winters, they stay in walrus hide and plank tents although before, they lived in the so-called igloos which are also known as â€Å"nynglu†. At summer time, their homes are made of wood covered with walrus skins forming the shape of a rectangle. Today, the Yupik now live in modern houses powered by electricity and petroleum oil instead of seal oil which was used by them previously. They also have glass walls around their houses. One difference between the American and Siberian Eskimos as pointed out by Vajda is the presence of men’s communal house or commonly known as â€Å"kashim† which is common among the American Yupik rather than the Siberian Yupik. For their livelihood, the Yupik people rely on the oceans and rivers since there are located along the shores. They still continue to hunt and get their own food even if there are suppliers of food on stores coming from ships and planes of other countries. Hunting fish is the major source of food for the Yupik especially for those living on the islands. During summer, salmons caught from rivers are dried for the winter season. Walrus meat were dried and stored in a semi-cold temperature so that they can be fermented and boiled up as food. (Vajda) Other varieties of available fish include: (1) cod, (2) halibut, and (3) herring. For additional dietary supplements, they also hunt down seals and walruses which are very common along the Bering Sea and they also consume shellfishes, terrestrial mammals (moose and caribou), birds, bird eggs, and plants. According to Vajda, they hunt the walruses by using open leather boats known as â€Å"angyapik† and small canoes known as â€Å"kayaks†. They use a whalebone clapper which produces the killer whale sound that drives the walruses and seals towards the shore where the hunters with spears are awaiting for them. Whale hunting was also a routine but only rarely because one whale can feed the whole village of Yupik. The Yupik people use dogs as their pack animals. (Vajda) They store their food in underground caches located in their houses. For their transportation, the Yupik people use land vehicles and snow mobiles. For sea transportation and hunting, they use the â€Å"Umiaks† which are boats made from walrus’ skins. Before, snails and oars were used in propelling the boats but as the world modernizes, so are their boats which use outdoor motors. Culture and People Characteristics Yupik are said to be well adaptive to new surroundings and strong individuals. On the other hand, upon going with the flow to new ways of living, the Yupik customs and culture remained strong and intact. Their customs are mainly focused on the rituals of hunting and sharing. Their relationship with other groups such as the Chukotka brought back the practices of trade and intermarriage. The Yupik are composed of male exogamic clans or lineages. Each clan or lineage has a unique myth or origin of existence and every clan member who dies is buried in a single location exclusively for the clan. The returns from hunts and foragings are equally shared among the clan members. According to studies, the clans in the pasts owned large dwelling houses which can house around 200 to 400 members of their respective clans. (Vajda) Language, Writing and Education. The language being used by the Yupik people belong to the Yupik branch of the Eskimo family. The Yupik language and writing were developed by the missionaries in the 1800’s who formulated a way of inserting the Latin alphabet (shown in Figure 1) in writing Yupik. The language was named after a missionary named John Hinz and was also used in publishing translations of the Bible and other religious scriptures. In Siberia, the use of Cyrillic language (shown in Figure 2) was developed by scholars although some who know the way of writing Yupik tend to write in Russian instead. By 1960’s at the University of Alaska, a group of scholars with the assistance from native Yupik speakers gathered together in order to formulate a new orthography for Yupik. One of their objectives was to devise an orthography that could be encoded on an English keyboard, without the presence of accent marks or extra letters. Aside from that, they also desired to symbolize the individual sounds or the pronunciation of the language with separate letters. (Vajda) The Yupik language is spoken by approximately 11,800 people who live at Alaska and Siberia. The Yupik writing is composed by the Latin alphabet in Alaska and Cyrillic alphabet in Siberia. In Russia, 800 of the 1700 Yupik speak the Yupik language fluently. Most Yupik also speak the Chukchi and the Russian language fluently. (Vajda) According to Ray Barnhardt (1999), the education is reaching the people on Alaska particularly the Yupiks. One of the good signs that were reported by Barnhardt (1999) is the enhancement of knowledge and skills of teachers and soon to be teachers in the region through short education courses. These developments are essential for personal growth for the Yupiks through education aside from lessons learned from experiences. Figure 1 (Latin Alphabet for Yupik) Figure 2 (Cyrillic Alphabet for Yupik) Beliefs and Religion The Yupik according to Vajda are animists whose beliefs in resemblance with those of the Chukchi people. For them the killer whale, raven and wolf are considered sacred and must not be executed. The Yupik, as well as the the Chukchi and Korak, believes that Raven had created the world. The swallow (bird) is also paid respect and honor because it was thought to protect hunters at sea. Killer whales are also revered as protectors of hunters; it was also thought that the killer whale turns into a wolf in winter and devoured the reindeer unless some of the reindeer submitted to the hunters. Ritual meals are concluded by throwing a piece of meat into the sea to bless and thank the killer whales which are believed as the cause of their catches. More than among American Eskimo groups, Siberian Yupik shamanism is inclined toward placating or giving importance to the sea animals in which the clans depended on for nourishment. There are also special ceremonies which were held before the departure of hunting boats as asking for guidance and bounty for food. (Vajda) Conclusion The culture of the Yupik / Eskimo people is amazing because of two things. One is because of their ability to adapt to environment for survival. Surviving in a low temperature location like in Alaska, Greenland or Siberia requires expertise in keeping oneself warm at all occasions. The supply and availability of food is not that high in lower temperature places but the ability of this group to find ways in order for them to adapt and be well versed in this kind of environment. This paper has shown way beyond the pictures of igloos and the Eskimos on textbooks of students. Second and most importantly is their ability to retain its culture and customs despite the adaptive measures and global changes that happen frequently. This is manifested through their religion and beliefs which if compared today’s beliefs and the existing religion will make theirs primitive. Beyond these changes and adaptations, the notion of keeping ones identity despite changes is what people and clans can admire and imitate from the Yupik people.

Biometrics Security Essay - 1393 Words

Biometrics Security Biometrics uses personal characteristics to identify users. When it comes to security, mapping unique patterns and traits in fingerprints, irises or voices is considered light years ahead of forcing employees to memorize combination of letters and numbers -- which are easily compromised and easily forgotten. The technology works by taking measurements -- whether it is the weight and length of bones in the hand or the pattern of blood vessels inside the eye or the pattern of fingerprints -- and then storing the specifics, often called minutiae, in a database. When a user scans a hand or retina, the new mapping is compared with the stored data. Access is either granted or denied based on matching patterns that are†¦show more content†¦A boom in research and development largely driven by an increasing need for accurate forensics has produced quality improvements and price reductions. A stand-alone fingerprint reader might have cost anywhere from $2,000 to $3,000 two years ago, but now it can sell for less than $100. Analysts say fingerprint scanning is the top biometric in terms of mind and market share, with hand geometry coming in second, followed by face and iris scanning. Theres a growing crop of biometrics vendors expanding the market and pushing what was once technology solely aimed at forensics and government security into the enterprise market. Companies such as Identix of Sunnyvale, Calif., Veridicom of Santa Clara and Key Tronic in Spokane, Wash., are taking biometrics corporate. And theyre catching the eye of industry giants like Compaq, which is embedding fingerprint scanners into keyboards and laptops. When we first started working with Identix, going back about six years, it cost several thousand dollars for a fingerprint reader the size of a small telephone, says Joel Lisker, senior vice president of security and risk management at MasterCard International in Purchase, N.Y. The current model is embedded in the keyboard, and its in the $5 to $10 range. MasterCard, which issues employee identification cards with smart chips embedded in them, is testing different biometric methods for everything from building access to network access. LiskerShow MoreRelatedBiometrics Security Technology : Biometric Authentication System897 Words   |  4 PagesBiometrics security technology provides automated methods of recognizing a person based on a physiological or behavioral characteristic. 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